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To what extent was international pressure placed on Nyerere and 
Karume to unify their two states in April 1964? The argument made is 
that even though Americans were initially very pleased with the 
outcome of the Union—because they thought it would help stem the 
spread of communism in the region—this was not a Western-initiated 
plan forced upon East African leaders. Indeed, the evidence shows that 
Americans were largely in the dark and in fact very frustrated by their 
lack of influence on the situation. Instead, the Union merely served as a 
confluence of African and American interests. The internal factors are 
inspected by highlighting African concerns over outside interference, 
worries about domestic stability, and a desire by Karume to consolidate 
his power. Finally, the traditional conceptualization of the Tanganyika-
Zanzibar Union as being either a product of the Cold War or an 




On 20 April 1964 the Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar was agreed 
upon in principal by Abeid Karume and Julius Nyerere in a closed door 
meeting in Dar es Salaam attended by only a small handful of high-level 
ministers. Two days later across the Zanzibar Channel the two heads of state 
signed the Articles of Union, binding the states together in a political merger. 
The question that historians and other commentators are still trying to 
straighten out fifty years later is why, exactly? The standard reply for years 
has been that the Union was a shining example of the ideals of Pan-
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Africanism and served as the model which proved that there could be 
political unity between African nations. However, in 1989 author and activist 
Amrit Wilson came out with the provocative thesis that the Union was not an 
African initiative, but was engineered and orchestrated by the Americans 
and British in order to stop the spread of communism in eastern Africa. In 
her view the United Republic of Tanzania was an American and British 
creation through the means of manipulation and subterfuge.1 This 
interpretation seemed feasible in light of the revelations about the CIA’s 
involvement in the Congo just prior to the Zanzibar Revolution that 
demonstrated the obvious lengths Americans were willing to go in order to 
engender regime change in Africa.2 As tensions have risen between the 
mainland and the islands in the last few years, this debate over the role of 
foreigners in engineering the Union has been discussed by prominent 
academics Issa Shivji3 and Haroub Othman, writer Godfrey Mwakikagile, as 
well as a host of commentators in the Tanzanian media and the East African 
blogosphere. 
 
A close reading of recently released American National Security files, CIA 
documents and interviews with the Tanganyikan Attorney General who 
drafted the Articles of Union, reveals that while the Americans were initially 
very pleased with the outcome of the Union—because they thought it would 
help minimize the influence of the “radical elements” in the Zanzibar 
Revolutionary Council and stem the spread of communism in the region—
this was not an American or British initiated plan forced upon East African 
leaders. Indeed, the evidence shows that the Americans were largely in the 
dark and in fact very frustrated by their lack of influence on the situation 
with regional leaders. The idea of federating Tanganyika and Zanzibar was 
clearly an African one, an idea which had its own long and complicated 
history stretching back to the 1940s well before Anglo-American concerns 
over the Zanzibar Revolution. The actualization of the union agreement in 
April of 1964, however, was principally the responsibility of two individuals, 
Julius Nyerere and Abeid Karume, and was built out of both their longtime 
interests and desires as well as their complex concerns over the evolving 
situation in the early months of 1964. Therefore the Union between 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar served as a confluence of interests. It helped meet 
the needs of the principle African leaders involved and was also an outcome 
that the Americans were temporarily pleased with as they thought it would 
be beneficial to their own geopolitical interests. However, neither the 
Americans nor the British were the prime movers or significant shapers of 
this plan. Instead, the Union was conceived by Africans and largely 
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fashioned by Nyerere and Karume’s key advisers, Tanganyikan Minister of 
External Affairs, Oscar Kambona, and Zanzibari Vice President Abdulla 
Kassim Hanga. It was the agendas of the two heads of state and the initiative 
shown by a few of their top ministers that guided the unification process. 
The merger was not a plan cooked up by British or American agents and 
diplomats and then forced upon the leaders of these two nascent post-
colonial states.  
 
This paper is not concerned with the legality or legacy of the Union, but will 
focus on the narrower question of what was the extent of the international 
pressure placed on Karume and Nyerere, and is there any evidence that the 
Union was conceived by the CIA, the American State Department or the 
British Foreign Office? This paper will retrace the days and events just after 
the Zanzibar Revolution in January 1964 through the mid part of 1964, after 
the Union had been implemented, in order to try and untangle who knew 
what and when. What then follows is a brief examination of the historical 
background of the African idea of federating Tanganyika and Zanzibar and 
the connection of Karume and Nyerere to those discussions of African unity 
from the mid-1940s continuing through discussions of federation in the late 
1950s and 1960s. This historical perspective, which is often missing in the 
debates about the Union, will be used to help give a fuller picture of the 
internal, or East African, factors going into the decision to unite politically.  
 
Zanzibar: East Africa’s Guinea? 
Much has been said about the American and British concerns that post-
revolutionary Zanzibar would become “an African Cuba,” serving as a 
bridgehead for the spread of communism into the African continent. 
Certainly in the hours immediately following the Revolution this had already 
developed into a principal concern of American diplomats in East Africa 
such as the American Ambassador to Tanganyika, William Leonhart, who 
along with the Western media would repeatedly use this phrase over the 
next several months.4 (Somewhat ironically, however, the first use of the 
term may have been introduced by President Nyerere himself who suggested 
in a conversation with Leonhart on the night of the Revolution that the 
former Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP)-led government was “far more 
likely to produce an ‘east African Cuba,’” than any government led by Abeid 
Karume.)5 Nonetheless, the American concern was very real as seen in the 
statement put out the day after the Revolution by the US State Department’s 
Director of Intelligence and Research entitled, “The Communist Spectre 
Looms in Zanzibar.” The central concern from the start was to try and 
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distinguish who in the new revolutionary government was a “moderate” or a 
“genuinely African nationalist,” and who was a communist-inspired radical.6 
This was in line with an emerging belief in the American government that all 
true African nationalists were by definition non-aligned because they wanted 
their nations to be sovereign and not dependent on any other non-African 
state—whether capitalist or communist in orientation. Despite this 
oversimplified view, American policy since the Kennedy years had been to 
show goodwill to any African nationalists who favoured a non-aligned 
foreign policy, because this was deemed the most realistic and safest play in 
Cold War geo-politics.7   
 
From the start the Americans believed that Abdulrahman Babu was the most 
dangerous and potentially subversive member in the new Zanzibar 
government, the Revolutionary Council (RC). They believed he was a 
committed “communist, Chinese variety” who was loyal to Beijing. In fact, 
they felt certain the Chinese had supported Babu in the past and would back 
his bid to take control of the government if the opportunity arose.8 Other 
leaders initially seen as communist threats included Abdulla Kassim Hanga, 
who was believed to be Soviet-trained but whose primary orientation was 
towards African nationalism; and finally the Americans believed (incorrectly 
through bad MI-5 information) that self-styled Field Marshall John Okello—
the military commander of the insurrection—and his armed thugs were all 
Cuban-trained.9 Towards the other end of the spectrum was Karume who 
was credited as being a “genuine African nationalist” and was clearly seen as 
the most popular politician in the islands and therefore deserving of Western 
support, even if he was viewed as “ignorant and inept.”10  
 
Just three days after the Revolution the US State Department was already 
concerned that no “concrete efforts” were being pursued by East African 
governments or the United Kingdom to keep Zanzibar from being drawn 
into the communist camp.11 Over the coming weeks the Americans began 
contemplating a myriad of different plans for influencing the situation. All of 
these various strategies were discussed via a flurry of telegrams and face to 
face meetings between American diplomats and their British counterparts. 
Few, however, were ever implemented—to the great frustration of a number 
of American and British officials.  
 
Already by 17 January the CIA was reporting that they believed a “power 
struggle seem[ed] likely between African nationalist and pro-communist 
elements” in the Revolutionary Council.12 William Leonhart thought the first 
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step in helping shore up support for Karume and the moderates would be to 
give American diplomatic recognition to the Revolutionary Council.13 The 
ambassador believed that this would give substance to the new 
government’s profession of non-alignment, help prove America’s friendly 
disposition towards the regime, and bolster the “African nationalist” 
character of the Revolutionary Council. But this early plan was foiled 
because the British were balking on the issue of recognition until they felt the 
situation became more settled. Their inaction tied American hands because 
US policy since the Eisenhower administration was that America would let 
Britain take the lead when it came to issues in their former African colonies.14 
Thus they would not recognize the new government until the British did so 
first. This entangling policy of relying on the British would continue to 
muddle the Anglo-American response to the Zanzibar situation in the 
following weeks.  
 
A new East African crisis, however, would momentarily draw Anglo-
American attention away from the events in Zanzibar. Between January 19 
and 24 army battalions in Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya all mutinied over 
issues of pay. To the dismay and shame of Nyerere, Ugandan Prime Minister 
Milton Obote and Kenyan Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta, all three had to ask 
their former colonial masters to send military assistance to help restore order 
in their countries.15 The British military intervention in these East African 
states did more than just distract the Americans and British from the 
developments in Zanzibar, it also provided the inspiration for a new course 
of action across the Zanzibar Channel. The use of British soldiers to pacify 
the situations on the mainland prompted Leonhart to wonder if a precedent 
had now been made for British intervention in Zanzibar. Recognizing that 
British warships were already in the vicinity and that the new mood in the 
region might now be more favourable to British military action, Leonhart 
recommended that the East African leaders persuade Karume to request 
British assistance in disarming some of the gun-slinging bands roaming 
Zanzibar’s alleyways and remove any undesirable individuals that Karume 
might want gone. By this time a couple of hundred Tanganyikan police 
officers had already been requested by Karume to restore order in the 
islands, and the idea was that the Brits would not have to land troops, but 
just show sufficient force off Zanzibari shores to allow the Tanganyikans to 
collect arms under the shadows of British warships. One interesting aspect of 
this plan was to try and reach Karume through Jomo Kenyatta, whom they 
viewed as the best channel to contact Karume, and get him to ask the British 
to intervene. Indeed, over the next three months numerous British and 
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American diplomats saw Kenyatta as the key to fixing the Zanzibar 
conundrum. It was thought that Kenyatta would be more receptive to doing 
this favor for the Western powers and that, according to Leonhart, Nyerere 
was seen as having too much “on his plate,” and was too indulgent of 
Babu.16  
 
Upon receiving Leonhart’s message, American Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, 
and Under Secretary of State, George Ball, became greatly concerned about 
the situation and were “anxious to compare notes with the British,” and 
consult the highest levels of the British government to see what their 
response was to such a plan. They made clear that the US would let the 
British take the lead, that they “would not provide any military support,” but 
that they were assessing non-military forms of assistance. In response, the 
British were willing to approach Karume and offer military assistance, but 
made it clear that they would only go in on one of two conditions: that 
Karume made his request for assistance in writing, or that they had solid 
evidence that British lives were in danger. But by 1 February it was clear that 
neither of these two conditions existed and that the plan could not be 
implemented. Part of the problem stemmed from the fact that the British 
High Commissioner to Zanzibar, Timothy Crosthwait, felt he had no 
leverage with Karume and that it would be difficult to even find a way to 
approach Karume on such a topic. Even if he had broken through to Karume, 
British intervention was probably the last thing Karume wanted to see due to 
his fears of a Western-led counter-revolution.17  
 
British and American discussions of intervention were soon redirected to the 
more immediate crisis of what to do over the impending exile of their 
diplomatic staffs owing to their continued delay of granting political 
recognition of the new government in Zanzibar. Tensions were only cooled 
towards the end of February after the British finally decided to grant 
recognition. The Americans followed immediately afterwards that same day. 
To American minds, however, British dithering cost them a certain amount 
of favor and creditability because their recognition came a full month after 
the Cubans, and several weeks after the Soviets, Chinese and several other 
socialist countries. But at least the belated recognition enabled both 
diplomatic missions to be allowed to return to the islands and reopen their 
consulates.18  
 
By early March, though, American Secretary of State Rusk was growing 
impatient with waiting to hear what the British “action plan” was to stop the 
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spread of communism. Rusk was considering plans for educational and 
economic aid, but he wanted to gather together the opinions of all American 
diplomats in the region to come up with talking points to send over to the 
UK Foreign Office. The first item for consideration was to find a way to 
eliminate the influence they believed Babu held over Karume. Rusk again 
returned to the idea of approaching East African leaders to explain the 
dangers of communism to Karume since the British and Americans’ 
influence on the Zanzibar government was deemed “negligible” and they 
were in no position to reach Karume. Rusk hoped the other three leaders 
would be able to talk to Karume without Babu present. Rusk also toyed with 
the idea of returning the volatile Field Marshall Okello to Zanzibar who had 
been sidelined by Karume and forced to leave the islands. He now believed 
Okello to be an opponent of Babu and might serve to “slow down Babu’s” 
perceived rapid rise to power. Finally, as will be discussed in greater detail 
below, Rusk also suggested one “long-range solution might lie in some form 
of federation.”19  
 
The same day Rusk sent out his talking points memo, British High 
Commissioner Crosthwait had finally received a meeting with Karume 
whose “reception was quite cool.” Far from applying any pressure on 
Karume, Crosthwait was not even able to get Karume to extend an invitation 
for a routine meeting with the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations, Duncan Sandys, who was currently touring East Africa. Karume 
did not see the point when he felt “he no particular business to discuss” with 
Sandys.20 Regardless, Sandys met with Karume two days later, but Leonhart 
disappointingly noted that only “non-substantive matters were discussed.”21 
Leonhart took the opportunity to meet with Sandys and his British 
counterpart in Dar es Salaam to brainstorm future plans for Zanzibar. The 
newly appointed American chargé d’affairs for Zanzibar, Frank Carlucci, and 
William Atwood, the American Ambassador to Kenya, were also present and 
the group agreed that Anglo-American political and economic leverage in 
Zanzibar was “slight” and they still believed getting Kenyatta to act was the 
key to success. Sandys did talk with Kenyatta during his East Africa trip and 
encouraged him to meet with Karume, but Mzee was “cool to the idea” and 
appeared to have no intention of going. When Sandys responded to Rusk’s 
query over a British action plan, he reiterated that the British would only 
intervene with an invitation from Karume, and now added the stipulation 
that all three East African leaders had to give their approval as well. After his 
meetings in Zanzibar and Nairobi he knew this was not going to happen 
anytime soon.22  
E. R. Sanders 
42 
 
Because of the growing conviction that the Americans and British had very 
little influence with Karume directly, between mid-March and mid-April the 
most ubiquitous plan that continued to emanate from London and 
Washington D. C. was to encourage Kenyatta to get the other East African 
leaders to see Babu as a communist and a threat, and then to get them to 
approach Karume and encourage him to take the necessary steps to force out 
the left-leaning elements of his government.23 Again, Nyerere was seen as too 
“weak” and that Tanganyika was an “unlikely channel” to get to Karume.24 
On the ground in East Africa though, Anglo-American diplomats were 
coming to believe that this approach was unworkable and would have no 
effect. In Nairobi, American chargé Laurence Vass made strong appeals to 
Kenyatta to act, but Kenyatta made no promises and it was felt that he was 
not actually going to follow through with anything.25 In Zanzibar, 
Crosthwait and Carlucci agreed that even if Kenyatta did make a “strong 
approach” towards Karume that it would be ineffective.26 Certainly their 
own attempts to reach Karume met with no success. Crosswaith complained 
that he had “no chance” of meeting alone with Karume, and when Carlucci 
scored a visit with Karume later in April and tried to subtly bring up the 
issue of “Eastern imperialism,” Karume appears to have shut the 
conversation down due his unwillingness to listen to American opinion on 
the topic.27 Leonhart would receive a similar rebuff in Dar es Salaam. Despite 
Leonhart’s earlier suggestion to Rusk that the Americans “not make another 
direct approach [to] Nyerere on Zanzibar but let Kenyatta take the initiative,” 
he changed his mind after a March 25th Zanzibar cabinet reshuffle which 
allegedly entrenched pro-communists in all the key ministries prompted him 
to pluck up the courage to discuss Zanzibar with Nyerere on his next 
meeting. Leonhart received a gentle rebuke from Nyerere who blamed 
America’s lack of influence with Karume on taking too long to recognize his 
government and told Leonhart that Tanganyika would not intervene on 
behalf of Americans any more than they had.28  
 
Since it became clear to Leonhart and Carlucci that none of the East African 
governments were willing to get involved and attempt to sway Karume, they 
both began to consider all sorts of alternate scenarios which they shared with 
the State Department between mid-March and mid-April. Carlucci’s ideas 
ran the entire gambit from learning to live with Babu and hoping that one 
day he would see the “value of true non-alignment,” to creating a local 
incident that would serve as a pretext for intervention.29 Carlucci also 
considered a high-impact personal item like giving Karume his own 
helicopter and pilot.30 Leonhart’s plans were more diplomatic in nature. If 
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Nyerere, Kenyatta and Obote were unwilling to talk to Karume about the 
perils of communism, maybe Americans could encourage other African 
leaders such as Sékou Touré and Hastings Banda, or other Commonwealth 
leaders to create positive relations with Zanzibar. He considered getting 
other international organizations to send special missions, as well as buying 
a large amount of cloves from Zanzibar that the Soviets had just reneged 
on.31 The State Department liked the idea of encouraging allies to make a 
presence in Zanzibar and in early April began asking a number of American 
Ambassadors in Africa, Europe, Asia and Australia to approach foreign 
governments on establishing a mission or presence in Zanzibar.32 The 
response to this plea to friends seems negligible, but one interesting 
development came in a meeting with Visiting Indian High Commissioner 
Tandon who suggested to Carlucci that the Americans intervene directly and 
that the Indian government, concerned over the treatment of Indians in 
Zanzibar, might be willing to assist and send a warship.33 David Bruce, 
American Ambassador to the UK, was the first to respond that this plan was 
out of the question, pointing out that “overt American intervention was not 
feasible.” This was quickly followed by a message from Tandon’s superiors 
in Delhi distancing the government of India from Tandon’s plan and 
confirming there would be no naval support from India.34 
 
By mid-April all American hope in East African leaders reversing the course 
of events in Zanzibar had “vanished” and the thought of a Karume-invited 
British-led military intervention was still seen as out of the question. 
Therefore, Thomas Hughes, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and 
Research, drew up a major internal memorandum on US policy alternatives 
for Zanzibar (no foreign dissemination) and submitted it to the Secretary of 
State on 15 April. The memo estimated that Zanzibar would soon become the 
first fully communist-aligned state in Africa. It was believed that Zanzibar 
would indeed become an African Cuba, serving as a showcase of socialist 
economic development and an entrepôt for communist propaganda in 
Africa. Hughes commented that the best America could hope for at this point 
was that Zanzibar would instead one day develop into an East African 
Guinea—a reference to the fact that even though post-colonial Guinea 
initially became closely aligned with communist countries in order to receive 
aid, that after a while they adopted a “genuinely neutralist posture.” Thus, 
taking a somewhat defeatist attitude and focusing now on long-term 
strategies, Hughes suggested that America had only two options: a) try to 
quarantine the island or b) maintain a light Western presence and hope to 
take advantage of future opportunities that might materialize. (Hughes did 
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concede that uninvited military intervention was a third theoretical option 
but argued it was not worth exploring as it would be counterproductive.) It 
was thought that quarantining, using the standard Cold War weapons of 
blockades, boycotts and embargoes on a struggling Zanzibar economy was 
bound to come across as mean spirited and would be resented everywhere 
on the African mainland and beyond. Therefore, since isolating Zanzibar was 
believed to be ineffective in this case, it was recommended that the best 
course of action was to keep lines open, maintain a small presence, and hope 
that mainland states would not succumb to Zanzibar’s temptations, but in 
time serve as a counter-influence for softening Zanzibar’s leaders. And 
maybe, if they were fortunate, tensions arising from the Sino-Soviet rivalry 
on the islands would allow for an opening for Americans to return to a 
position of influence.35  
 
The comments in the British and American communications during the 
preceding month and the tone of this memorandum were clearly born out of 
frustration over a lack of Western influence. The Americans obviously 
believed that hope was presently lost and they were disappointed that their 
East African friends were unwilling to take action. There was one line, 
however, in the Hughes memorandum that has gained attention in light of 
the events that transpired in the days following its release. In a section 
lamenting that the time had almost certainly passed when mainland African 
states could reverse the trends in Zanzibar, Hughes wrote glumly that the 
“prospects for outflanking Zanzibar’s radicals by drawing the island into 
East African regional arrangements also seem unpromising.”36 In the 
following days something very similar to this unfolded as it was announced 
that Tanganyika and Zanzibar were going to unite. This process eventually 
even led to a neutralizing of Babu and other “radicals” like Salim Rashid and 
Ali Mafoudh. This has led commentators to question whether Americans had 
any foreknowledge of this plan. Was it indeed an idea conceived by 
Americans? Were Karume and Nyerere, who signed the Articles of Union 
between the two countries, pressured into a decision by Westerners pushing 
this plan of federation? We turn to these questions presently.  
 
The Idea of a Union 
The very first record in the American files of any discussion about federating 
or uniting Tanganyika and Zanzibar came just days after the Revolution 
when Oscar Kambona requested a meeting with William Leonhart to discuss 
the arrest of Americans in Zanzibar. Meeting at Kambona’s house on January 
16, Kambona mentioned that Karume, Hanga and Babu had come to see 
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Nyerere to ask him for police advisers and help.  During this initial meeting 
the Zanzibar delegation “said they would like to discuss union or federal 
relationship with Tanganyika in [the] near future.” This piece of information 
must not have initially struck Leonhart as too important because he made no 
comment on it in his report nor did he bring it up with Nyerere at his next 
meeting with the Tanganyikan president.37 This exchange at Kambona’s 
house was reported by the CIA a couple of days later.38 (Most CIA reports at 
this time were commentaries based on gleanings from State Department 
telegrams as they did not have any agents on the ground in Zanzibar during 
the weeks following the Revolution.)39 This first mention of some sort of 
union or federation is illuminating because it indicates several things. First, 
the very idea of some sort of federation or union was first brought up by 
Kambona, and not the Americans. Moreover, American understanding (and 
misunderstanding) of such a plan was always based on the information they 
received from Africans. Second, it shows that Babu was privy to the early 
discussions of federation. Finally, it demonstrates that there may be some 
evidence that the idea was first suggested by Karume and not Nyerere, 
although there is quite a bit of disagreement on this point as various parties 
involved have told different versions.40 
 
A little over a week later Kambona again mentioned to Leonhart that “the 
new GOZ [Government of Zanzibar] leaders continued to press for early EA 
Federation including Zanzibar.” Kambona’s response to the Zanzibaris was 
that it was still too controversial to be undertaken quickly because the Afro-
Shirazi Party, the political party that made up the bulk of the Revolutionary 
Council, had long been accused of being mainland agents. He told the 
visitors that he felt Zanzibar should exist as an independent state for some 
months before discussions on federation resumed.41 Whether or not this is 
exactly how the discussion between Kambona and the Zanzibar leaders 
unfolded, or instead just how Kambona wanted Leonhart to think they 
unfolded, cannot be ascertained. However, it does speak to the fact that 
Tanganyikan-Zanzibar discussions on federation or union began almost 
immediately after the Revolution and that initially the discussions were 
focused on a larger East African Federation and not just a partnership 
between the two countries. 
 
After Kambona’s second mention of high level discussions about federation, 
Leonhart and the State Department took more notice of this idea and 
wondered if it was worth further exploration to see if some sort of federal 
solution could possibly help alleviate the communist threat in the islands. 
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Coming just after the mainland mutinies when the US was contemplating a 
number of actions including a British military intervention and approaching 
East African leaders to do more to help, Secretary of State Rusk asked 
Leonhart to arrange a meeting to discuss the Zanzibar situation with 
Nyerere. He gave Leonhart a list of twelve questions to ask Nyerere which 
were mostly focused on obtaining Nyerere’s assessment on the situation and 
various Zanzibar actors, but also to see if Tanganyikan or Kenyan police 
could do more to support Karume and disarm the communist elements. The 
very last question was, “What are Nyerere[’s] views on possible federation 
Zanzibar with Tanganyika”?42 Nyerere’s answer to Leonhart the next day 
was that even though he was much closer with the current government of 
Zanzibar than the previous one, that, “there was not practical possibility of 
Federation Zanzibar and Tanganyika alone and EA Federation ‘very distant 
prospect.’”43 Nothing was made of this at the time, but it did alter American 
perception that Nyerere was unwilling to have a federation between the two 
countries, and that if anything was to happen it needed to be a regional 
federation in which Kenyatta was again believed to be the key.  
 
The next mention of a federation in the American correspondence was not 
until a month later when there were a flurry of meetings and discussions to 
devise a new action plan. In Rusk’s talking points memo sent out to the 
various American diplomats involved (mentioned above), he noted that one 
“long-range solution might lie in some form of federation.” He observed the 
government of Zanzibar’s possible interest in a federation from Leonhart’s 
earlier reports and wondered if Nyerere might be asked again about this 
issue despite his “previous objections [to the] idea.” However, because 
Nyerere was viewed as unwilling to go it alone, and because it was believed 
Kenyatta was more concerned over Babu than Nyerere was, Rusk thought it 
best to seek Kenyatta out first to see if the Kenyan prime minister would not 
raise the issue with Nyerere in a discussion about a larger East African 
federation.44 But the consensus that March at the meeting between Sandys, 
Leonhart, Carlucci and the others in Dar es Salaam was that the Americans 
“nor the British believe Tanganyika-Zanzibar Federation practical 
possibility.” They suggested the only “outside chance Nyerere might 
consider” some form of federation was if Kenyatta was willing to bring 
Kenya into a regional federation.45 Once again the idea was dropped and it 
would be another month before there was any revival of British or American 
interest in this outcome.  
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The next brief mention of a potential federal arrangement was only in a 
passing comment in early April when a distressed Nyerere approached 
Leonhart and shared his grave concerns over a rumor about a 2500-strong 
Arab force training to prepare to invade Zanzibar and retake it for the Sultan. 
Nyerere asked both the American and German ambassadors if they had any 
intelligence about this counter-revolutionary force. Leonhart obviously did 
not and in fact wondered if this frantic plea was not some sort of political 
cover by Nyerere to send more Tanganyikan troops to Pemba, or possibly 
some form of incorporation “by Kenya or Tanganyika or both.”46 More 
substantially, American interests were again raised a couple of days later in 
light of the impending East African Federation talks between Kenyatta, 
Nyerere and Obote to be held in Nairobi on 10 April. The day before on their 
way to this conference a Zanzibar delegation stopped in Dar es Salaam to 
have a meeting with Tanganyikan officials. Hanga, Babu and Twala were at 
this meeting but Karume was not present due to the illness of his wife. 
Mbwambo, the Tanganyika Chief of Protocol, informed Leonhart that the 
major topic was whether or not Zanzibar would seek membership in the East 
African Federation. Mbwambo would not elaborate any further, but he 
revived American interests in such an arrangement. Babu and Hanga 
attended the meeting in Nairobi as spectators as “the big three” tried to 
hammer out a plan. According to Kenyan minister Murumbi this meeting 
went poorly. The climax came when Nyerere gave the emotional plea, “We 
want federation now!” Kenyatta instantly agreed, but Obote went silent. It is 
questionable whether Kenyatta was truly eager for federation, but the result 
of these talks made it clear that there would be no East African Federation, or 
at least not anytime soon.47 It was the following week that Hughes put out 
his major memorandum on US alternatives sombrely stating that any hopes 
of minimizing radicals through a regional federation were extremely 
doubtful.  
 
It was the day after Hughes’ memo was written that Leonhart first 
discovered that there were serious talks scheduled to take place to discuss 
some sort of political arrangement between Zanzibar and Tanganyika 
without Kenya or Uganda. Reporting on a private meeting he had with 
Kambona on 16 April, Leonhart explained that Kambona had come to him in 
“the strictest confidence” that secret talks had begun with certain Zanzibar 
leaders regarding a Tanganyika-Zanzibar federation after the breakdown of 
the East African Federation talks in Nairobi. He mentioned specifically 
working with Abdulla Hanga, his long-time friend since their university 
days in London in the 1950s, as well as Saleh Saadalla, but specifically 
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pointed out that cutting Babu down to size was an intended outcome of the 
federation—a sentiment obviously pleasing to American ears. In his report to 
the State Department, William Leonhart questioned whether Nyerere would 
support such an initiative, but promised he would keep an eye on 
developments with the “Kambona project.”48  
 
Two days later Leonhart received a call from Kambona stating that if the 
plan was going to work then the best opportunity would be the upcoming 
weekend—a reference to Babu’s absence from Zanzibar on a trip to Asia. He 
noted that he had brought other Zanzibar leaders in on the talks, Abdul 
Twala who was the acting Foreign Minister while Babu was abroad and 
Yusuf Himidi. Kambona had to travel to Tabora that weekend but he had 
recruited Harue Tambwe, a TANU stalwart who had strong connections to 
Zanzibar, to go talk to Hanga to see what he needed so that the deal could be 
sealed within the week. Importantly, Kambona mentioned that Karume had 
already “given tentative agreement” to an association and reconfirmed that 
the project had Nyerere’s support as well. Believing the plan may actually 
have the consent of the two critical players needed to pull off such a project 
certainly piqued Leonhart’s attention, but his initial response was still 
somewhat cool. Leonhart obviously wanted Babu out of the picture, but the 
prospect of a Zanzibar dominated instead by Hanga and Twala was also 
unpleasant. In fact, in classic Cold War paranoia style, Leonhart warned 
Washington that the Soviets might be behind this plan to unite Tanganyika 
and Zanzibar in order to counteract Chinese influence (via Babu) in the 
islands, have their man Hanga installed instead and then expand their 
influence on the mainland. Leonhart recommended that the US needed to 
proceed cautiously and gain more information before they considered giving 
full US support to what was still being referred to as Kambona’s plan.49 
When Leonhart informed Carlucci of the secret talks the next day, the 
Zanzibar chargé agreed that Hanga was preferable to Babu, but that he too 
would hopefully be removed at a later date.50  
 
The response from the State Department was to wait and see what this 
“Tanganyikan initiative” for some sort of federation or incorporation would 
entail. They thought since it was an “African initiative”—something they 
were originally hoping would come through Kenyatta—that this was the best 
and maybe even “the only possibility of reversing [the] present critical 
situation in Zanzibar.” But they were also wary of stepping in and risking 
precipitating Soviet or Chinese involvement, and thus Leonhart was told to 
wait for Kambona to come to him before any offers of US assistance were 
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made. But certainly the US was willing to give its “blessing” if the plan 
would exclude Babu and his clique from power.51  
 
The nature of these American cables indicates that the idea of a Tanganyika-
Zanzibar union was clearly conceived by Tanganyikans and Zanzibaris and 
not American diplomats, who even initially suspected the Soviets of being 
behind it. When the Articles of Union were signed by Nyerere and Karume 
the only Western officials that had any clue of what was happening were 
Leonhart, Carlucci and the State Department higher ups back in Washington 
like George Ball who had read Leonhart’s incoming telegrams. Subsequent 
cables indicate that the American Embassies in Nairobi and Kampala were 
still in the dark, as were all of the British officials who as of the 22nd of April 
were still talking about putting pressure on Kenyatta to talk to Karume.52 
Moreover, in the following days it became clear that the Americans and 
British were anxious over the feasibility of what was now being referred to as 
Nyerere’s evolving strategy or the “African solution.”53 The African formula 
brought with it the possibility of reactionary violence or, maybe worse, 
conniving counter-plans by Babu and his followers to use the larger 
mainland platform to spread their radical influence even wider. Less than a 
week after the Union the British and Americans were complaining that little 
had been done to reduce communist influence in the islands and they once 
again began considering alternative courses of action to bring “outside 
forces” to bear on the situation. Again, this hand-wringing and strategizing 
happened mostly at the level of internal discussions between Americans and 
their British allies and there was little direct action taken. Different kinds of 
support for Nyerere and Karume were considered, both “quiet support” as 
well as gifts of aid and other assistance. Previous strategies were dragged 
back out such as getting other African leaders to persuade Karume or 
Nyerere to cement the union and the non-aligned character of the new Union 
government. There were also contingency plans for military intervention and 
sending in emergency forces.54 It was not until the very end of June that the 
Americans felt they could breathe a little easier and that they were “at [the] 
end this overheated period.” For the foreseeable future it looked as if the 
Union would last and that the African plan had gone a long way to reduce 
the threat of Zanzibar becoming a communist bastion in Africa.55  
 
Internal Motivations behind the Union  
The Union was not an Anglo-American idea and the process of political 
unification was not pushed through due to direct pressure from the 
Americans, British or any other outside forces promoting such a plan. But if 
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Karume and Nyerere did not give in to “irresistible pressure from Western 
powers,” it remains to be asked what factors compelled these two African 
leaders to take this extraordinary step?56 The answer to this question has 
usually been formulated in an either/or construct, it was either Pan-
Africanism or a product of Cold War. But in order to fully answer this 
question, one must understand the complicated local power dynamics, the 
inter-personal relationships that were at play, and importantly, understand 
that the aims of Pan-Africanism cannot be extracted from the problems of 
decolonization and the Cold War from which it was born.  
 
The first thing to point out was that many of the players involved had a 
certain amount of idealism regarding African unity, what one might call the 
more romantic side of Pan-Africanism. Many of the Afro-Shirazi and TANU 
politicians had cut their political teeth in the African Association in the 1940s, 
a group declaring that all Africans were one and whose motto was “Umoja ni 
Nguvu” (Unity is Strength). As early as 1947 the members of this trans-
territorial organization explicitly declared at an Association-wide conference 
that they were willing to see the political federation of Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar. At this time both Karume and Nyerere were heavily involved in 
the Association and Karume was undoubtedly at the conference and among 
those that passed the resolution supporting federation while Nyerere, if not 
in attendance himself, would have certainly read about the resolution 
through the organization’s highly-organized communication network.57 The 
desirability of such a federation was again confirmed in 1958 when leaders of 
the ASP and TANU agreed that they wanted to amalgamate the countries 
into one republic after independence had been achieved.58 The general 
atmosphere throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s was very pro-unity, to 
the point where declaring loyalty to the ideals of Pan-Africanism was 
widespread. This genuine, if not surface-level, desire for political unification 
is likely part of the reason why Babu had been interested in unifying some of 
the countries in East Africa as seen in his participation in a number of 
discussions on federation and his later assent to the “idea of unity.”59 It can 
also be seen in Aboud Jumbe’s response on the discovery that the union had 
taken place in his absence. When Karume asked his opinion, Jumbe’s 
instinctual reaction was, “unity is strength.”60 
 
But as the case in the rest of Africa has seemed to prove over the years, the 
ideals of unity and the discussions of Pan-Africanism rarely translated into 
transfers of power or political unification or federation. Thus other factors 
must have helped precipitate the unification of these two states. In the case of 
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post-Revolutionary Zanzibar and Tanganyika it seems to have been a 
concern over outside intervention, a mutual reliance on the outcome of each 
state for purposes of domestic stability, and a desire by Karume and those 
loyal to him to consolidate his position and power.  
 
From the standpoint of Karume and the Revolutionary Council, they very 
clearly relied on the help and support of the Tanganyikans after the 
unexpected Revolution. The new leaders had been thrust into the position of 
having to first calm the situation and then start providing for the people of 
the islands in this post-crisis period. Zanzibaris immediately turned to long-
time allies and friends in Dar es Salaam for assistance. In the week following 
the Revolution there were multiple trips to the Tanganyikan capital by 
Hanga and Babu and even a trip by Karume himself to request various 
support from the Tanganyikan government. They needed medical experts 
and supplies, technicians to restore essential services, help in organizing a 
police force and basic food items. Nyerere sent a Tanganyikan police force to 
help restore order along with medical supplies, sugar and other food stuffs in 
aid. Karume also turned to Nyerere for guidance in how to deal with 
political liabilities, ex-government ministers he wanted removed from the 
scene, and the problematic John Okello who had given Karume his position, 
but who could not be trusted in the new cabinet.61  
 
From the record it appears that it was during these initial talks about Okello 
and assistance that the idea of unifying the two states was specifically 
discussed in light of Karume’s political concerns. Karume not only saw the 
mainland as a place where he could get rid of his political adversaries, but it 
seems likely that he felt Tanganyika’s assistance could help stave off foreign 
intervention from a number of directions. From the beginning Karume was 
deeply concerned about a counter-revolution. He was highly suspicious of 
both the Americans and the British whom he felt had supported the outgoing 
regime, and at several points over the early months of 1964 he appeared 
concerned they would try to reinstate the old order. They had shored up the 
other post-independence East African regimes after the mutinies, why would 
they not help the ZNP government as well? He even arrested four American 
journalists he believed to be “CIA Counter Revolutionaries.” This deep 
mistrust explains in part his coolness towards the Americans and British 
throughout the period.62 But Karume also apparently feared a number of 
Arab Gulf monarchies whom he believed wanted to reinstall the Sultan.63 
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In the months following the Revolution Karume’s growing concern centered 
on the rising power of Abdulrahman Babu and other non-Afro-Shirazi Party 
members of the Revolutionary Council like Ali Mafoudh who had become 
the defacto commander of Zanzibar’s armed forces after the removal of 
Okello.64 Karume and Babu had been thrust into their positions by Okello 
who intentionally wanted members from both the ASP and the recently 
banned Umma Party of Babu to serve in the Revolutionary Council after he 
overthrew the ZNP-led government.65 Even though Karume worked with 
Babu out of necessity at first, inside sources indicate that there were always 
real fault lines between those RC members who were leaders of the ASP 
before the Revolution and those who were not. Indeed, there was deep 
mistrust and opposition towards Babu by some ASP leaders.66 Certainly, the 
progression of events and the way in which the Union was pushed through 
clearly indicate that sidelining Babu and consolidating Karume’s power and 
influence in the islands was a central motivation on the Zanzibar side. 
 
Babu had been involved in early talks regarding some form of federation in 
January and again in early April, but the timing of the final agreement was 
intentionally arranged to align with his trip to Asia. There had been previous 
private meetings between Karume and Nyerere, but events sped up rapidly 
once it was clear that a larger East African federation was not going to 
happen and Babu was going to be away from Zanzibar. In the week leading 
up to the signing and ratification of the Articles of Union, when messages 
were going back and forth between Kambona and Hanga, Kambona made it 
clear that if anything was going to happen it needed to be within the next 
week and the reason must have been to avoid any efforts by Babu to block 
the agreement.67 This is corroborated by the Tanganyikan Attorney General, 
Roland Brown, who had been secretly brought into knowledge about the 
potential union by Nyerere who wanted him to draft a legal document laying 
out how a union agreement would work. With Babu’s temporary absence, 
tremendous pressure was put on Brown to finish the Articles of Union 
quickly so that Nyerere and Karume could sign them before Babu’s return.68   
 
After secretly meeting in Dar es Salaam on 18, 19 and 20 April, Karume and 
Nyerere finally came to an agreement.69 The last touches to the Articles were 
completed and brought to Zanzibar by Nyerere, Kambona, Job Lusinde, the 
Minister of Home Affairs, and three other Tanganyikans. The signing 
between Karume and Nyerere was also witnessed by some of Karume’s top 
advisers including Abdulla Kassim Hanga and Abdul Twala who had both 
been in on the secret talks.70 The Articles were then whisked away by 
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Kambona and Roland Brown to be shown to Kenyatta and Obote in Nairobi 
and Kampala, respectively, who had both been excluded from any 
knowledge about the talks. (There were concerns they would be upset for not 
previously being made aware of the secret talks.) After giving Karume and 
Hanga a couple of days to politic for the Union, the Articles were then 
returned to Zanzibar with Kambona, Lusinde and Brown for their ratification 
by the Revolutionary Council on the evening of 25 April. Brown was sent to 
the ratification to answer any legal questions which were raised, but was 
asked to sit outside the meeting.71 Salim Rashid had tried to stall the meeting 
until Babu’s return (which ended up being later that night) by bringing in a 
lawyer from Uganda to raise legal objections with Karume. Karume was 
undeterred by his meeting with the lawyer earlier that afternoon,72 and the 
ratification meeting went ahead even without the presence of several 
Revolutionary Council members, including Rashid who was possibly on his 
way to pick up Babu from the airport.73 A passionate plea was given by 
Hanga that the Union was necessary and that the Articles must be approved. 
Hanga was clearly Karume’s closest ally who had stuck by the Sheikh during 
an earlier period of division within the ASP, he had a long-time personal 
relationship with Kambona, and being Karume’s number two he also stood 
to gain the most by having Babu’s power checked.74 The ratification by the 
Revolutionary Council took longer than expected, but Karume received the 
endorsement of enough members, with several others abstaining.75 With the 
approval of the RC, Kambona, Lusinde and Brown immediately headed back 
to Dar es Salaam where the Tanganyika National Assembly was waiting on 
their return to start the process for Tanganyikan approval. This was a much 
smoother process with nothing but positive speeches led by Nyerere 
himself.76  
 
The manoeuvre was complete, but Kambona was still concerned about how 
Babu would react to the news, telling Leonhart that “If Babu agrees, he will 
be a fool, but he may do so.”77 Babu finally met with Karume the next day 
and the president reportedly told him in front of other ministers that the 
Revolutionary Council had “voted unanimously in favor of Union,” (only if 
one did not count the abstentions) and that “he could either agree or resign.” 
The extremely bright Babu must have recognized that something subversive 
was afoot and decided not to challenge Karume at that moment but carefully 
responded that “he agreed with the idea of Union.”78 When the new Union 
cabinet was announced the following day Babu was given a high position, 
but one in Dar es Salaam directly under Nyerere and away from the 
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Zanzibar scene.79 Babu was the first casualty of Karume’s use of the Union 
arrangement to clip the wings of political threats in the island.80 
 
Nyerere, Kambona and Lusinde also wanted to see Babu’s influence 
diminished, although not for reasons of securing personal power, but due to 
a desire to avoid external interference in African affairs. For them, Babu was 
just one part of a larger concern over foreign intervention. Similar to the 
Americans, the Tanganyikans too were concerned about too much 
communist influence in Zanzibar, but for slightly different reasons. Nyerere 
and Lusinde both thought a prosperous communist-backed Zanzibar would 
serve to destabilize the domestic scene within Tanganyika. If the small 
islands were turned into a showcase of the financial fruits of aligning with 
the socialist powers, Nyerere was afraid it would undermine all his claims 
that remaining non-aligned held out the best solution for Tanganyikans.81 
Lusinde too was worried about potential contrasts between Dar es Salaam 
and Zanzibar, noting that it was the urban poor who were involved in acts of 
mob violence during the mutiny and who were the most likely to cause 
problems for the government. They needed no new inspiration from 
Zanzibar social revolutions.82  
 
Direct intervention from outsiders, be it the West, the Soviets or the Chinese, 
was something that needed to be avoided according to the minds of Nyerere 
and Kambona. Kambona was concerned that Karume was making the 
mistake of relying too heavily on the various communist groups that were 
promising aid and giving military assistance. He was concerned that they 
were “trying to smother Karume with advisers and aid, never giving him 
time or room to stand off and see what’s happening,” and Kambona was also 
offended that the Soviets and Chinese were acting like Africans could not 
think for themselves. Kambona noted that the union was a “gamble” but that 
something had to be done before the “Easterners” took over the island. He 
felt it was the mainland African states’ responsibility to help keep Zanzibari 
Africans from such a fate.83 
 
On the other hand, Nyerere was also concerned over a possible Western 
military intervention in Zanzibar. Even though Nyerere never received any 
direct pressure from the West to unite Tanganyika and Zanzibar, (as 
demonstrated above and confirmed by Roland Brown)84 he was aware of 
discussions over British military intervention which created a type of indirect 
burden to do something to find an African solution to the problem before 
there was another embarrassing show of force by the ex-colonial powers.85 
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Nyerere did not want either side in the Cold War meddling in the affairs of 
East Africa. This is seen in part through his constant rebuffs of US and British 
assistance when it was offered in the early months of 1964.86 This concern 
also played into his reasoning for why he was willing to take on the risk of 
merging with Zanzibar without the other East African states. Even though 
some form of union between Tanganyika and the Zanzibar islands had long 
been discussed, it was still only second best to Nyerere’s larger vision of an 
East African Federation. Nonetheless, the exigencies of the situation 
compelled Nyerere to act.  
 
So was this Pan-African idealism? The answer can only be yes if one 
recognizes the strong utilitarian strand in the Pan-African Movement of the 
1950s and early 1960s. The desire for African unity was born out of the desire 
to fight imperialism in all of its forms and was imbued by the Spirit of 
Bandung which sought a way out of the binary world of the Cold War. The 
Pan-African Manifesto and the All-African People’s Congress promoted a 
united and strong Africa which would not tolerate interference from any of 
the big powers and which hoped to solve its own problems and become a 
significant player on the world stage.87 Thus the Union was not founded 
solely on some abstract or romantic notion of unity, but it was forged 
through a process shaped by both Karume’s concerns over losing power and 
Nyerere’s utilitarian Pan-Africanism that desired to protect Zanzibaris, and 
ultimately Tanganyikans, from non-African intervention into East African 
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